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The recent literature that analyzes the e®ect of takeovers on stakeholders has
focused primarily on moral hazard issues, with a particular emphasis on the
ideas that takeover threats create value by disciplining managers and workers,
and that they can reduce value by leading managers to act myopically and by
restricting the possibilities to enter into implicit contracts with stakeholders1.
The formal analysis of all these e®ects on stakeholders within the ¯rm suggests
that these e®ects share many similarities with those on stakeholders outside
the ¯rm, and particularly on the ¯rm's trading partners. However, it is not
clear that moral hazard is an important problem in a number of business re-
lationships, e.g. a seller-buyer relationship. Even when moral hazard creates
substantial problems, these problems may be a®ected by other problems such
as asymmetric information. Can takeover threats have real e®ects in the ab-
sence of moral hazard? In this paper, we address the e®ect of takeover threats
on asymmetric information problems. We point out that being a (either short-
term or long-term) takeover target a®ects the informational °ows and the terms
of trade in a long-term relationship.
In our setup, we rule out any moral hazard issues. We assume instead
that the only issue is asymmetric information between the ¯rm and its stake-
holders. Speci¯cally, in the presence of a takeover threat, (i) privately known
parameters of stakeholders are modi¯ed, and (ii) the possibility for the ¯rm
to extract rents may be altered. Hence, takeovers and takeover threats a®ect
the incentives of stakeholders to reveal information as well as the amount of
rents that can be captured from them. This allows us to derive empirical pre-
1See, among others, Grossman and Hart (1980), Scharfstein (1988), Stein (1988), Grin-
blatt and Titman (2001, ch. 20), Shleifer and Summers (1988), and Chemla (2003a).
2dictions on the e®ects of takeover threats (that do not convey any particular
information) on pricing strategies and on information °ows within and across
¯rms by considering a long-term relationship between an uninformed ¯rm that
is a potential takeover target and a privately informed one2.
Formally speaking, such relationships are characterized by issues that can
be captured in terms of dynamic adverse selection problems. In particular,
in the case of a non durable good, these relationships lead to the celebrated
ratchet e®ect: The actions taken at the beginning of the relationship reveal
information that the previously uninformed party will use in subsequent con-
tract o®ers to increase his pro¯t at the expense of the informed party. Hence,
the informed party may be reluctant to reveal this information early if the
uninformed party does not induce him to do so credibly, which is often costly
to her. Inducing information revelation thus requires that contract o®ers by
the uninformed party be subject to the constraint that the informational rent
when information is not revealed is lower than the payo® to the informed party
if he chooses not to reveal his type. For instance, a worker may refuse to reveal
a high productivity because he expects that this would lead the manager to
ask for more demanding performance requirements in the future. A buyer fac-
ing several consecutive buying decisions is reluctant to pay a high price at the
beginning of the relationship as he expects that the seller, after learning that
the buyer is willing to buy the good at a high price, will subsequently choose
a higher price. In both cases, the pro¯t to the ¯rm is reduced because of the
informed party's long term strategy.
2Asymmetric information may also be regarded as a proxy for rent extraction in, say,
the problem of a dynamic monopoly that tries to extract rents from buyers distributed on a
traditional demand curve. From this viewpoint, the possibility of a takeover that is expected
to a®ect pricing strategies will a®ect the ¯rm's ability to engage in price discrimination.
3This paper investigates how these problems are a®ected by the possibility
of a takeover. The takeover a®ects the relationship between an initially unin-
formed ¯rm and a privately informed buyer in two ways. On the one hand, the
bidder creates value by increasing the buyer's valuation. On the other hand, it
can increase the fraction of the surplus that the ¯rm will obtain, and decrease
the fraction of the surplus that will be left to the buyer. These two e®ects
are meant to capture and to combine two ingredients that are central to the
literature on the real e®ects of takeovers: Value creation and wealth transfer
at the expense of stakeholders. The higher valuation increases the surplus that
goes to the buyer, which increases his incentive to disclose information to the
¯rm. This enables the ¯rm to charge a higher separating price in the ¯rst pe-
riod. On the other hand, high bargaining power allows the ¯rm to appropriate
a higher share of the surplus and increases the bene¯t from the information
revealed by the buyer in subsequent periods. Since information revelation is
more harmful to the buyer, the ¯rm must cut the price o®ered to the buyer in
order to induce him to reveal his information. This price can become so low
that the ¯rm is better o® not inducing the buyer to reveal his information with
certainty. Overall, takeovers that create signi¯cant value favor information dis-
closure, while wealth-transferring takeovers make information disclosure more
costly.
Existing contributions on takeovers that involve asymmetric information
generally consider asymmetric information between the target ¯rm's manage-
ment and the bidder and/or shareholders (Hirshleifer, 1996). Most of them
focus on information revelation via the takeover and its characteristics (see,
e.g., Fishman, 1989, Eckbo, Giammarino and Heinkel, 1990, Brown and Ryn-
gaert, 1991, and Nagarajan, 1995). In our setup, the asymmetry of information
4is between the target ¯rm and its stakeholders, rather than between the target
¯rm and the bidder.
Our results are consistent with empirical papers that document that takeovers
lead targets to increase output prices following an increase in market power
(Kim and Singal, 1993) or in leverage (Chevalier, 1995, Phillips, 1995). How-
ever, these empirical papers (1) do not distinguish between the change in capital
structure and the change of corporate control; (2) they examine the e®ect of
takeovers on product market prices by focusing on competitors; and (2) they
are mostly silent on the e®ects of takeover threats. In this paper, we investigate
the e®ect of takeover threats on the dynamics of pricing strategies when there
is no change in capital structure3. We further discuss a number of other em-
pirical predictions on the real e®ects of takeover threats, managerial turnover,
pricing strategies, and trade credit.
Section 2 sets the model. Section 3 ¯rst presents the impact of rent sharing
on information disclosure and on the terms of trade. Section 4 analyzes how
takeovers that can both create value and transfer wealth from the buyer to
the bidder a®ect information °ows and transaction prices. Section 5 discusses
alternative interpretations for some assumptions in our model, as well as appli-
cations to, and empirical predictions on, the performance of takeover targets,
pricing decisions, and trade credit. Section 6 concludes.
3In analyzing the e®ect of ¯nancial transactions on information revelation in dynamic
adverse selection problems, this work is in line with Chemla and Faure-Grimaud (2001) who
show how a high debt level enabled a non informed party to induce a privately informed one
(with whom it is engaged in a long-term relationship) to reveal it at a lower cost. Due to the
possibility of liquidation associated to a high debt level (even when renegotiation is allowed),
the informed party is led to reduce the attention it pays to the future informational rents
from refusing to reveal information today.
52T h e M o d e l
2.1 The Product Market
A¯ r mF can produce and sell one unit of a non durable good to a buyer in
both periods 1 and 2. The buyer has private information about his valuation
v that can take values VL or VH,w i t hVH >V L > 0, under the incumbent
manager I. Initially, it is common knowledge that v = VH with probability ¸1.
The production cost is 0. As in standard adverse selection problems (e.g.
Maskin and Riley, 1984), we assume that the ¯rm is better o® selling the good
at price VH with probability ¸1 t h a ns e l l i n gi ta tp r i c eVL with probability 1,
i.e. ¸1 > ¹ ¸ ´ VL=VH. For simplicity, we restrict the analysis to short term
contracts unless otherwise speci¯ed4. The discount factor is denoted ±.
2.2 The Takeover
For simplicity, the incumbent manager is assumed to maximise shareholder
value. After the stage 1 product market decisions, the relationship between
the ¯rm and the buyer can be a®ected by a takeover that has the following
characteristics:
² The stage 2 buyer's valuation under the bidder, B,i sbv,w h e r eb>1.
In other words, the buyer's valuation for the good is higher under B's
management than under I's management, and the bidder's valuation for
the ¯rm is higher than I's.
² The takeover a®ects the way the surplus is shared between the ¯rm and
the buyer. Speci¯cally, if a stage 2 product-market transaction takes
4Renegotiation constraints would have long term contracts exhibit dynamic adverse se-
lection problems (La®ont and Tirole, 1993).
6place, the buyer gets a fraction 1¡®I of the surplus under the incumbent
manager, and a fraction 1 ¡ ®B 6=1¡ ®I if the takeover took place.
Fractions ®I;® B are common knowledge.
² In order to takeover the ¯rm, B must incur a ¯xed cost C>0 in addition
to the price he pays to the incumbent owner(s).
One possible interpretation behind these probabilities is that the takeover
a®ects the following simple bargaining game. With probability ®d;d2f I;Bg,
called the manager's bargaining power, the manager makes a take-it-or-leave-it
o®er to the buyer. With probability 1¡®d, the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it
o®er to the manager. The reasons why the bidder may have higher bargain-
ing power may include a higher concentration in ownership structure and a
more rigorous management (see Habib, 1997, and Jarrell et al, 1988) after
the takeover. A higher ownership concentration is likely to increase the ¯rm's
bargaining power, since a larger shareholder bene¯ts more from a favorable
bargaining outcome and is, therefore, prepared to allocate more resources to
negotiation. Alternatively, a takeover may increase market power, whether it is
a horizontal merger (see, e.g. Kim and Singal, 1993) or a vertical merger (Rey
and Tirole, 2002, and Chemla, 2003b), and hence make the buyer's outside
options less attractive. On the other hand, the bidder may be less informed
about some speci¯cities of the target ¯rm, which is likely to leave the buyer
with more rents5. Section 5.1 argues that this assumption that the buyer ap-
propriates di®erent fractions of the surplus under the incumbent manager and
under the bidder can also be interpreted as di®erences in stochastic valuations
5When a takeover does not a®ect market power, but decreases marginal costs of produc-
tion, it may be the case that a takeover is followed by a decrease in prices. For instance,
if the ¯rm faced a traditional downward sloping demand curve, a decrease in the marginal
cost would be followed by a decrease in prices.
7or in abilities to write a full-commitment long term contract. Note that our
speci¯cation is convenient as it applies directly to the impact of takeovers on
both pricing strategies and industrial relations.
In this model, we rule out any ine±ciency in the takeover bid. Hence, the
nature of the merger bid does not a®ect the analysis, as it does not a®ect the
probability of success of the takeover. Speci¯cally, the price at which I sells
his shares to B does not a®ect the analysis. Empirical evidence suggests that
the surplus usually goes to the shareholders of the target ¯rm (Jarrell et al,
1988), which is consistent with the assumption that the incumbent manager has
all bargaining power vis-µ a-vis the bidder. One reason for this is that, during
the takeover of a publicly listed ¯rm with dispersed ownership, free-riding
target shareholders may appropriate all the surplus created by the takeover
(Grossman and Hart, 1980)6.
2.3 Timing, Equilibrium, and Objectives
The timing is as follows:
² In period 1, the manager and the buyer bargain over a price corresponding
to the sale of one unit of the good. If both parties agree, the transaction
takes place according to the terms of the agreement. Otherwise, both
parties get 0. Then, the bidder decides whether or not to take over the
¯rm.
² In period 2, the manager and the buyer bargain over a new price. If no
agreement is found, both parties get 0. Otherwise, the production and
sale take place according to the terms of the agreement.
6Among other possibilities, bidders can overcome the free-rider problem and make up for
the takeover cost by buying a block of shares before the takeover, by capturing non-monetary
bene¯ts, or by dealing with risk-arbitrageurs (Grinblatt and Titman, 2001).
8A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is characterized by i) a sequence of prices
fp1;p 2g o®ered by the manager and prices fw1;w 2g o®ered by the buyer. A
sequence of decisions by the buyer and the manager, respectively, to accept
these o®ers or not. We denote by xi
t(pt) the probability that the buyer of type
i 2f l;hg accepts an o®er pt (t =1 ;2); ii) a probability distribution de¯ning
the manager's beliefs about the buyer's valuation that is consistent with equi-
librium strategies and that uses the Bayes' rule. These beliefs are represented
by ¸1 in period 1 and by ¸2(I)i np e r i o d2 ,w h e r eI is the information obtained
at the end of period 1, i.e. either w1,o rx1 =0( r e j e c t i o no fa no ® e rp1), or
x1 = 1 (i.e. p1 is accepted); and iii) a decision by the incumbent manager to
o®er a price for a takeover and a decision for the bidder to accept it or not.
When the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave it o®er, he o®ers w1 = w2 = 0, i.e.
the ¯rm's reservation price, and the ¯rm obtains no rent. Hence, the buyer's




1(p1)(v ¡ t1)+( 1¡ ®I)±xi
2(p2)(v ¡ t2) if there is no takeover
xi
1(p1)(v ¡ t1)+( 1¡ ®B)±xi
2(p2)(v ¡ t2) i ft h e r ei sat a k e o v e r
(1)





2(p2)t2] if there is no takeover
®Ixi
1(p1)t1 + z if there is a takeover (2)
where z is the transfer from the bidder to the ¯rm's incumbent owner(s), if there
is a takeover. Finally, the bidder's objective is maxf¡z¡C +®B±xi
2(p2)t2;0g..
93 The E®ect of Rent Sharing on Prices and
The Dynamics of Information Flows
We ¯rst analyze the impact of bargaining on the buyer's decision to reveal
information and on the ¯rm's pricing strategy. We proceed by backward in-
duction.
When the ¯rm makes a period 2 o®er, the buyer of type i 2f l;hg accepts
any o®er p2 · vi and turns down any other o®er. Hence, the ¯rm o®ers p2 = VH
if ¸2VH >V L and p2 = VL otherwise, where ¸2(p1) is the probability that i = h
knowing that p1 was rejected.
A low valuation buyer will only accept a period 1 price o®er p1 that is lower
than VL. In contrast, a high valuation buyer accepts o®er p1 if, and only if, his
r e n t si fh ea c c e p t si t ,i . e .VH ¡ p1, are at least as high as the rents he foregoes
by not mimicking a low valuation buyer. The latter rents equal the probability
that I makes the price o®er times the present value of the expected di®erence
in valuations, i.e. ±®I(VH ¡ VL) (the appendix provides more information on
this). Hence, a high valuation buyer accepts with probability 1 a price o®er
that is lower than or equal to
^ p1(®I)=VH ¡ ±®I(VH ¡ VL): (3)
This separating price is higher than VL so that the low valuation buyer
turns down the o®er, but it is lower than VH so that the high valuation buyer
is induced to accept the o®er. The price that induces the high valuation buyer
to reveal his information with probability 1 is an increasing function of both
VL and VH. The higher VL, the lower the di®erence VH ¡ VL,a n dt h el o w e r
the expected rents that the high valuation buyer gives up by disclosing his
valuation. This increases the ¯rst period price that the incumbent manager
10can charge to induce the buyer to purchase the good with probability 1. The
reason why the price increases in VH is that an increase in VH increases the
bene¯t from purchasing the good in period 1 than it increases the rents that
have to be o®ered to the buyer to induce him to purchase the good in period 1.
If we distinguish between the high valuations in period 1 and in period 2, then
the separating price increases in the ¯rst period high valuation and decreases
in the second period high valuation.
The separating price is a decreasing function of ®I, the incumbent man-
ager's bargaining power in period 2. The higher I's bargaining power in period
2, the more likely I to make an o®er in period 2, and the higher the high val-
uation buyer's expected bene¯t from mimicking a low valuation buyer. This
makes it more costly for the incumbent manager to induce information revela-
tion in period 1.
The buyer may also be tempted to adopt a mixed strategy if p1 > ^ p1.
In that case, the period 1 price is accepted with probability ¸1x.W h e n ¸1
increases, the probability that the high period 1 price is accepted increases as
well. This increases the attractiveness of the semi-separating scenario to the
¯rm. After deriving this semi-separating outcome and comparing the ¯rm's
expected payo® resulting from this latter strategy from the former separating
strategy, we obtain
Proposition 1 : There exists ^ ¸1(®I) 2 (¹ ¸;1] such that the equilibrium is
separating with p1 = VH ¡±®I(VH ¡VL) when ¸1 · ^ ¸1(®I) and the equilibrium
is semi-separating otherwise. ^ ¸1 satis¯es
^ ¸1(®I)=
VL + ±®I¹ ¸(VH ¡ VL)
VL + ±®I(VH ¡ VL)
: (4)
Proof: See Appendix. 2
11It appears that ^ ¸1(®I)d e c r e a s e si n®I. This can be explained as follows:
Bargaining power has several con°icting e®ects on the ¯rm's payo®. On the
one hand, a high bargaining power gives the ¯rm a high probability to make an
o®er p1 and hence to appropriate a higher share of the surplus created. On the
other hand, it leads the ¯rm to decrease the ¯rst period price in order to induce
the high valuation buyer to reveal his information. In other words, it makes
information revelation more costly. But when its (¯rst period) bargaining
power decreases, the ¯rm is less likely to have the opportunity to induce the
buyer to reveal his information. When the ¯rst period o®er is made by the
buyer, the ¯rm's o®er in period 2 equals VH (as in the static case). Since the
second e®ect does not arise in the semi-separating scenario, an increase in ®I
favors a semi-separating outcome rather than a fully separating one. Overall,
the ¯rm is still better o® with a higher bargaining power, i.e. with a higher
share of a lower payo®.
Finally, when both VL and VH grow at the same rate from period 1 to period
2, the buyer's willingness to reveal information is higher. Growth emphasizes
the bene¯t of period 2 transactions, and favors period 1 information disclo-
sure. It is also immediate to check that the ¯rm may now bene¯t from not
having a bargaining power that is too high. This is consistent with the con-
ventional wisdom that the \working atmosphere" is better in growth ¯rms, as
their stakeholders expect to bene¯t more from a higher expected surplus, while
mature ¯rms tend to cut costs, reduce their stakeholders' rents, and experience
less communication among di®erent parties.
124 The Impact of Takeovers on Information Flows
The decision to takeover the ¯rm depends on the expected product market
payo® in period 2. At the beginning of period 2, the manager expects a
pro¯t ®d maxf¸2VH;V Lg,w i t hd 2f I;Bg.G i v e nt h ec o s tC associated with a
takeover, B will takeover the ¯rm if, and only if
(b®B ¡ ®I)±maxf¸2VH;V Lg >C (5)
Recall that the possible beliefs to the manager in period 2 are that the
buyer's type is h with probability
² either ¸2 =0o r¸2 = ¹ ¸: The ¯rm's expected pro¯t then equals the low
valuation;
² ¸2 = ¸1: The expected pro¯t in period 2 is then ®I±¸1VH if there is no
takeover and b®B±¸1VH after a takeover.
² ¸2 = 1: The expected pro¯t is then ®I±VH if I keeps control and b®B±VH
after a takeover.
Denote ¢® ´ b®B¡®I. Clearly, if C ¸ ¢®±VH, taking over the ¯rm would
not be pro¯table to I. There is no takeover threat and the equilibrium on the
product market is determined as in the previous section. If C<¢®±VL,t h e
takeover takes place whatever the buyer's type and whatever the equilibrium
in the product market. We restrict our analysis to the more interesting case
where B's decision to takeover the ¯rm depends on the equilibrium on the
product market, i.e. ¢®±VL · C<¢®±VH. This implies that there is a
takeover only if ¸2 = ¸1 and if ¸2 = 1. In this range, we may still want to
13distinguish between the cases ¢®±VL · C<¢®¸1±VH where the takeover
takes place when ¸2 = ¸1, i.e., after an o®er from the buyer in period 1, and
¢®¸1±VH · C<¢®±VH, where the takeover only takes place when ¸2 =1 .I t
is easy to see that these two cases a®ect information revelation similarly when
the ¯rm makes the ¯rst period o®er. Without loss of generality, we can restrict
ourselves to the case:
¢®±¸1VH · C<¢®±VH (6)
Clearly, the period 2 strategies are similar to those of the previous sub-
section. The low valuation buyer's decisions on the product market are not
modi¯ed compared to that of the previous subsection.
However, the high valuation buyer's response to an o®er p1 is modi¯ed.
This buyer expects that revealing his information will trigger a takeover. To
make him reveal his type with probability 1, the price o®ered by the ¯rm in
period 1 must now satisfy
VH ¡ p1 + ±(1 ¡ ®B)bVH >± ® I(VH ¡ p
0
2(¸2(x1 = 0))) + ±(1 ¡ ®I)VH: (7)
Hence, we obtain
Proposition 2 The price chosen by the ¯rm in order to induce the buyer to
reveal his valuation with probability 1 satis¯es
~ p1(®I;® B;b)=VH + ®I±VL +[ b(1 ¡ ®B) ¡ 1]±VH (8)
The separating price now increases with ®I and decreases with ®B.T h e
intuition behind this is simple. Revealing information triggers a takeover, but
14not revealing information prevents the takeover. When the ¯rm makes the
price o®er in period 2, the second period informational rent that the buyer
obtains if he did not disclose information previously is ±®I(VH ¡ VL). On the
other hand, the takeover increases the rent that the buyer obtains when he
makes the period 2 price o®er in period 2, but it decreases the probability that
he will make such an o®er.
The separating price equals the ¯rst period valuation minus the overall
expected rent that is a®ected by the prospect of the takeover. It is higher
than ^ p1(®I)i fb> 1
1¡®B and lower than ^ p1(®I) otherwise. The separating
price is higher than that in the previous subsection if the buyer bene¯ts more
from the increase in valuation after the takeover than he loses by having a low
bargaining power. Overall, the buyer bene¯ts from revealing information if the
takeover increases his valuation substantially. However, he loses if the bidder's
higher bargaining power a®ects the payo® to the buyer more than the increase
in valuation.
After analyzing the mixed strategy, we thus obtain:
Proposition 3 If ±b(VH¡VL¡®BVH) >V L+±(VH¡VL)¡±®IVL,t h e nt h es e p a -
rating equilibrium is unique. Otherwise, there exists ~ ¸1(®I;® B;b) 2 (¹ ¸;1] such
that the incumbent manager chooses the separating price ~ p1(®B;® I;b) when
¸1 · ~ ¸1(®I;® B;b) and a semi-separating price VH otherwise. The takeover
takes place with probability ¸1 if ¸1 · ~ ¸1(®I;® B) and with probability
¸1¡¹ ¸
1¡¹ ¸
otherwise. ~ ¸1 satis¯es
~ ¸1(®I;® B)=
VL + ±VL(b®B ¡ ®I)+®I±¹ ¸(VH ¡ VL)
VL ¡ (b ¡ 1)±(VH ¡ VL)+±(b®BVH ¡ ®IVL)
(9)
Proof: See Appendix. 2
15.
When b is high enough, the period 2 bene¯t of period 1information disclo-
sure is so high that the ¯rm always wants to elicit information from the buyer.
This, or a su±ciently low ®B, favors a separating equilibrium on the product
market7 Not only the prospect of a takeover leads the manager to change its
separating price when ¸1 < ~ ¸1(®I;® B), but also it a®ects the range where the
manager chooses a semi-separating price.
Corollary 1 ~ ¸1 increases with ®I and in b,a n di td e c r e a s e sw i t h®B.
The threshold ~ ¸1(®I;® B)i sh i g h e rt h a n^ ¸1(®I)i fb is high enough and if ®B
is low enough. However, as b goes close to 1 and ®B becomes signi¯cantly higher
than ®I, the separating price goes down, and the semi-separating equilibrium
becomes more likely.
A takeover creates value by increasing the buyer's valuation, but it may also
create value by leading to a separating equilibrium in cases where the equilib-
rium would have been semi-separating without the prospect of a takeover. On
the other hand, the possibility of a takeover may be socially costly when it
induces I to choose a semi-separating price while he would have chosen a sep-
arating in an environment without takeovers. Indeed, a semi-separating price
leads the high valuation buyer to buy the good in period 1 only with some
probability lower than 1 while he would have bought it with probability 1 with
a separating price.
Corollary 2 A takeover can create value not only by increasing the buyer's
valuation, but also by favoring a separating equilibrium when the increase in
7In our setting, the separating payo® does not depend on ®B because the e®ect of ®B on
the separating price compensates exactly the additional rent to the ¯rm in period 2 following
information revelation and a takeover.
16value is high enough. But when the increase in the buyer's valuation is small,
the prospect of a takeover can reduce value by restricting the probability of a
trade in period 1.
Finally, it should be noted that since the buyer appropriates a fraction
1¡®B of the increase in his valuation, some value-increasing takeovers do not
take place. Indeed, a takeover creates value in period 2 if ±(b¡1)[¸2VH +(1¡
¸2)VL] >C . Hence, there may be a hold-up problem that is created by the
buyer's rents and that will probibit value-creating takeovers.
5 Applications and Extensions
5.1 Stochastic Bidder's Valuation and Imperfect Com-
mitment
In this section, we discuss two alternatives to model the di®erences between
the incumbent manager and the bidder. Instead of a combination of a di®erent
valuation and di®erent bargaining powers, the di®erences between the incum-
bent manager and the bidder could arise from a (stochastic) bidder's valuation
and from a model where ®I and ®B would arise as di®erent abilities to stick to
a full-commitment long-term contract.
A deterministic bidder's valuation and a take-it-or-leave-it price o®er made
by the ¯rm to the buyer is a special case in our analysis (®I = ®B =1 ) .T h e
takeover occurs only when the bidder's valuation is higher than the incumbent
manager's. In this case, the takeover can only bene¯t the buyer through a
lower separating price in period 1. There can be no takeover that hurts the
buyer.
This need not be the case with a stochastic bidder's valuation and a take-
it-or-leave-it o®er from the period 2 manager. Speci¯cally, assume that the
17valuation is higher than v,o rt h a tb>1, with probability µ, and that it is
lower than v,o rt h a tb<1, with probability 1 ¡ µ. The bidder's valuation
is realised after the second period price o®er is made, but before the buyer
accepts or rejects this o®er. Then an analysis similar to that in section 4
indicates that following a takeover the possible period 2 prices are E(b)VH
and E(b)VL instead of bVH and bVL. Hence, the buyer accepts the price o®er
when b>1, but he rejects it when b<1, and then there is no trade despite
the fact that the buyer's valuation is positive. As in section 4, the buyer can
obtain a rent through a reduced period 1 separating price. In other words, the
probability µ plays a role similar to the bargaining power in our model. The
main di®erence with our model is that unless the ¯rm has the default option to
sell the good at price VL to another buyer the stochastic valuation then creates
an ine±cency when the buyer's valuation is lower than the price charged by
the bidder. With such a default option, however, the results are identical to
ours.
The ability to commit to a long-term contract with some probability is
another alternative way of interpreting our model that also leads to identical
results. It is well-known that such a contract is generally not-renegotiation-
proof (La®ont and Tirole, 1993), but the ¯rm may have an imperfect ability
to commit by making renegotiation di±cult or costly.
In our model, a full-commitment contract leaves the buyer with no rent in
year 2: Following the rejection of a period 1 price o®er to the buyer, the ¯rm
does not update its beliefs and charges the same period 2 price as in the static
case (Baron and Besanko, 1984), that is a price equal to the high valuation.
When the ¯rm cannot commit, we are back to our model with ®I = ®B = 1, i.e.
the cases where the ¯rm makes take-it-or-leave it o®ers to the buyer. Hence,
18the buyer can only appropriate a rent through the possibility that the ¯rm will
not be able to commit through a long term contract. Again, denoting ®I and
®B the probabilities that the incumbent manager and the bidder are unable to
commit to the long term contract leads to results that are formally equivalent
to ours8.
5.2 How Do Takeover Targets Perform?
The theory of disciplinary takeovers states that managers, or more generally
stakeholders, have to engage in value-creating actions in order to discourage a
bidder from taking over the ¯rm and taking this value-creating action9.O n e
problem with the moral hazard model without asymmetric information that
is often used (typically based on Grossman and Hart, 1980), the stakeholders
work hard to prevent a takeover, and the takeover takes place when the ¯rm's
poor performance is due to bad luck rather than low e®ort. However, consid-
ering an adverse selection problem (potentially combined with a moral hazard
problem) can lead to results where the low performance due to stakeholders'
low type triggers a takeover.
Our results further suggest that the target ¯rm's performance before the
takeover may be a®ected by the takeover threat. In our model, the expecta-
tion of a wealth-transferring takeover reduces the stakeholders' willingness to
reveal information, and it increases the cost of inducing information disclosure.
8In this second alternative again, the expected surplus created may be altered unless the
¯rm is assumed to have the default option to sell the good to another buyer at price VL.
Without such a default option, the surplus is not created if the buyer turns out to have a
low valuation.
9It should be noted that the disciplinary takeover argument may also be undermined
by stakeholders' entrenchment. When stakeholders are entrenched, it may be costly for
a bidder to engage in actions that will create more value than the incumbent manager.
Takeover threats may precisely encourage the stakeholders to engage in some irreversible
investment that make them entrenched. This may worsen the ¯rm's performance instead of
improving it.
19On the other hand, when stakeholders expect to bene¯t from a takeover, they
are less reluctant to disclose information. This suggests that an expected disci-
plinary takeover leads the ¯rm to underperform, which may in turn prompt the
takeover. However, the prospect of a takeover that is meant to create operating
synergies may well lead the ¯rm to perform better.
Existing tests on the performance of takeover targets (Agrawal and Ja®e,
2003) generally do not distinguish between these hypotheses. They do not dis-
tinguish either the hypotheses that some targets may underperform because
they are poorly managed or because takeover threats undermine the incen-
tives within the organization. For this purpose, it would be interesting to
test whether long-term takeover rumours (and potentially the nature of these
rumours) tend to improve or to worsen the performance of potential target
¯rms.
Our results lead to other predictions that cannot easily be derived through
a model based on moral hazard only. In a model with asymmetric information,
when the target ¯rm's stakeholders expect a takeover to be followed by a
strategy that leaves them with fewer rents, their outside options become more
attractive. Hence, the threat of such a takeover may lead them to leave the
target ¯rm. This is consistent with the casual observation that some ¯rms
that are subject to takeover threats tend to experience substantial managerial
turnover, and particularly the departure of some of their \best" managers to
competing ¯rms. The examples of Apple and a number of banks have been
widely documented in the business press, but apart from Mikkelson and Partch
who provide partial support for this we are not aware of any academic work
on the e®ect of takeover threats on managerial turnover.
205.3 Suppliers and Trade Credit
The literature on the real e®ects of takeover threats has generally focused on
workers and managers. This creates a di±culty, because the employment rela-
tionship is subject to many contingencies that may interfere with tests on the
real e®ects of takeover activity. Tests on the e®ect of takeovers on trade part-
ners may well be less noisy. Arguably, it is di±cult to track down input prices,
but it should be possible to analyze the e®ect of takeovers on supplier-buyer re-
lationships through the stock price reaction of (closely) vertically related ¯rms
after the announcement of a takeover, and especially through trade credit.
Most theories of trade credit rely on asymmetric information models (Smith,
1986, Lee and Stowe, 1993, Petersen and Rajan, 1997, Frank and Maksimovic,
1999, etc.). In particular, they point out that trade credit a®ects the ¯rm's
ability to price discriminate. Our paper is in line with this argument, and it
further suggests that the prospect of a takeover may a®ect the terms of trade
credit. We are not aware of any empirical paper that tests the e®ect of takeover
activity on trade credit.
Most trade credit contracts are typically short-term contracts that o®er a
grace period at a very low, or even zero, interest rate (Frank and Maksimovic,
1999). In our paper, trade credit at a low interest rate may be a way for
¯rms to give away rents to the buyer in order to encourage him to disclose
his valuation. Hence, a takeover that is expected to bene¯t (resp. hurt) the
buyer may well lead to less (resp. more) favorable terms in the trade credit
contract. This in turn decreases (resp. decreases) the attractiveness of trade
credit compared to standard credit. We then predict that the possibility of
such a takeover will decrease (resp. increase) the fraction of trade credit to
21¯nancing from ¯nancial creditors.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper has examined the interactions between a takeover threat and the
dynamics of pricing strategies and information °ows both across and within
organizations. We pointed out that takeovers may have real e®ects even in the
absence of any moral hazard problem. In particular, they may a®ect the way
information °ows among stakeholders. In addition, asymmetric information
may enhance the e®ects of takeover threats on incentives.
A comparison between asymmetric information and moral hazard models
can be drawn. The existing literature on the real e®ects of takeovers (based on
moral hazard) shares a number of features in common to the e®ects that were
developed in this paper. For instance, the argument that takeover threats
prevent ¯rms from entering implicit contracts (Shleifer and Summers, 1988,
and Chemla, 2003a) relies on an e®ect on stakeholders' incentives to invest
in a way that is parallel to the stakeholder's incentive to disclose information
in our model. Similarly, it is possible to derive results close in spirit to the
disciplinary takeover argument (Grossman and Hart, 1980, and Scharfstein,
1988), whereby a takeover threat induces stakeholders to reveal information.
As in moral hazard models, though, this would require a speci¯cation where
not disclosing information increases the payo® to the bidder.
Apart from relying on di®erent mechanisms than moral hazard models, an
asymmetric information framework may be more appropriate for seller/buyer
relationships. Such relationships may well be more appropriate to test real ef-
fects of takeover threats than relationships between shareholders, managers and
workers, mostly because labor contracts may include many contingencies that
22are widely independent of takeover activity. Asymmetric information models
can help derive a number of empirical predictions that cannot be easily derived
from moral hazard models and that can be tested on vertical relationships. For
instance, takeovers may a®ect the dynamics of pricing strategies, trade credit,
and stakeholder turnover.
23APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1:
Since the ¯rm o®ers the price p2 with probability ®I and gets 0 otherwise, its
expected pro¯t equals ®I± maxf¸2(p1)VH;V Lg.
The buyer's period 1 o®er will not reveal information about his valuation,
and hence it will not a®ect the ¯rm's second period expected payo®. Therefore,
whatever its type, the buyer makes an o®er w1 = 0. This implies that ¸2(w1)=
¸1 and that the ¯rm's expected pro¯t in period 2 is then ®I±¸1VH.
Since the ¯rm's period 2 o®er is never lower than VL, a low valuation buyer
cannot expect any additional surplus if he does not reveal its private informa-
tion. Hence he will accept any period 1 price o®er p1 lower than VL and he will
turn down any other o®er. A high valuation buyer accepts o®er p1 if, and only
if, his rents are at least as high as if he were mimicking a low valuation buyer.
He accepts the manager's o®er with probability 1 if, and only if, fp1;p 2;w 2g
satisfy
VH ¡ p1 + ®I±(VH ¡ p2(x1 =1 ) )+( 1¡ ®I)±(VH ¡ w2)]
¸ ±[®I(VH ¡ p2(x1 =0 ) )+( 1¡ ®I)(VH ¡ w2)]: (10)
When p1 satis¯es this condition, the high valuation buyer accepts with
probability 1 and if such p1 >V L the low valuation buyer rejects the o®er with
probability 1. The ¯rm's belief ex post is then ¸2 = 1 if the buyer accepts the
o®er and ¸2 = 0 if he rejects it, i.e. the equilibrium is fully separating. Hence,
p2(¸2(x1 =1 ) )=VH and p2(¸2(x1 =0 ) )=VL.S i n c ew2 =0i na l lc a s e s ,t h e
24separating price o®ered by the ¯rm in period 1 equals
^ p1(®I)=VH ¡ ±®I(VH ¡ VL): (11)
Let now consider the case where the ¯rm o®ers a price higher than ^ p1.I n
this case, only semi-separating equilibria where the high valuation buyer ran-
domizes may exist. In equilibrium, the high valuation buyer must be indi®erent
between accepting and rejecting an o®er p1.I fw ed e n o t e¾2 = Probfp2 = VLg,
this requires VH ¡ p1 = ±¾2®I(VH ¡ VL)10. Such an equilibrium also requires
that the ¯rm be indi®erent between choosing p2 = VL and p2 = VH
11. Hence,
the probability x that a high valuation buyer accepts to buy at price p1 in
period 1 must satisfy ¸2VH = VL,w i t h¸2 following the Bayes' rule
¸2 =
¸1(1 ¡ x)




= ¹ ¸; (12)
which implies that ¸1x =( ¸1 ¡ ¹ ¸)=(1 ¡ ¹ ¸). If the high valuation buyer rejects
the o®er, the expected payo® to the ¯rm in period 2 is ±®I[¾2VL+(1¡¾2)¹ ¸VH]=
±®IVL. Since this pro¯t does not depend on the o®ered price, which in turn
does not a®ect x, the ¯rm makes the highest ¯rst period o®er that the high
valuation buyer may accept, i.e. p1 = VH. This price corresponds to ¾2 =0 12.
Hence, the pooling, separating and semi-separating payo®s to the ¯rm can be
written
10If the LHS were higher than the RHS, the high valuation buyer would choose to reject
the o®er p1. Hence, no information would be revealed and the ¯rm would choose p2 = VH
with probability 1, which would drive the RHS to 0. This result would be consistent for no
p1 · VH. If the RHS were strictly higher than the LHS, the high valuation buyer would
choose to accept the o®er with probability 1, which would induce the ¯rm to choose p2 = VL
with probability 1. This result is incompatible with the assumption that p1 > ^ p1.
11If p2 = VH with probability 1, then for all p1 <V H the buyer is strictly better o®
revealing his private information in period 1. If p2 = VL with probability 1, then (since
p1 · ^ p1) the buyer would be better o® not revealing his information in period 1.
12In other words, since the ¯rm leaves the buyer with no rent in period 1, the fact that
the buyer must be indi®erent requires that it does not leave him any rent in period 2 either.
25¼
s
0 ´ ®I[¸1(^ p1 + ®I±VH)+( 1¡ ¸1)®I±VL]+( 1¡ ®I)®I±¸1VH
= ®I[¸1VH + ®I±VL]+( 1¡ ®I)®I±¸1VH (13)
¼
ss
0 ´ ®I[¸1x(p1 + ®I±VH)+( 1¡ ¸1x)®I±VL]+( 1¡ ®I)®I±¸1VH
= ®I
h¸1 ¡ ¹ ¸
1 ¡ ¹ ¸
VH(1 + ®I±)+
1 ¡ ¸1
1 ¡ ¹ ¸
±®IVL
i
+(1 ¡ ®I)®I±¸1VH: (14)
where superscripts s and ss mean separating and semi-separating, respectively.
Since ¸1 >V L=VH, the pooling payo® that the ¯rm would obtain if it did not
try to learn the type of the buyer in period 1, ¼
p
0 ´ ®I[VL + ±¸1VH] <U s
0.A
comparison of the separating and the semi-separating utilities yields the result.
2
Proof of Proposition 3:
If the buyer plays a mixed strategy, the ¯rm's expected pro¯t in period 2 is,
as in the preceding subsection, equal to ±VL. The pooling, separating and
semi-separating payo®s to the ¯rm satisfy
¼
p
F = ®I(VL + ®I±¸1VH)
¼
s
F = ®I[¸1(~ p1 + b®B±VH)+( 1¡ ¸1)®I±VL]+( 1¡ ®I)®I±¸1VH
= ®I[¸1(VH +( b ¡ 1)±VH)+®I±VL]+( 1¡ ®I)®I±¸1VH
¼
ss
F = ®I[¸1x(VH + b®B±VH)+( 1¡ ¸1x)®I±VL]+( 1¡ ®I)®I±¸1VH
= ®I
h¸1 ¡ ¹ ¸




1 ¡ ¹ ¸
®I±VL
i
+(1 ¡ ®I)®I±¸1VH: (15)
As before, the pooling payo® is dominated by the separating payo®. The
26separating payo® is higher than the semi separating one if, and only if,
[¸1(VH +( b ¡ 1)±VH)+®I±VL] >
¸1 ¡ ¹ ¸
1 ¡ ¹ ¸
VH(1 + b±®B)+
1 ¡ ¸1




VL + ±VL(b®B ¡ ®I)+®I±¹ ¸(VH ¡ VL)
VL ¡ (b ¡ 1)±(VH ¡ VL)+VHb±®B ¡ ®I±VL
: (17)




¹ ¸(b ¡ 1)±(VH ¡ VL)+( 1¡ ¹ ¸)VL




(1 ¡ ±®I)VL(VH ¡ VL)+VL(b ¡ 1)±(VH ¡ VL)+VH®I±¹ ¸(VH ¡ VL)




±VL®B[VL ¡ (b ¡ 1)±(VH ¡ VL)+VHb±®B ¡ ®I±VL]
[VL ¡ (b ¡ 1)±(VH ¡ VL)+VHb±®B ¡ ®I±VL]2
+
±[VH(1 ¡ ±®B) ¡ VL][VL + ±VL(b®B ¡ ®I)+®I±¹ ¸(VH ¡ VL)]
[VL ¡ (b ¡ 1)±(VH ¡ VL)+VHb±®B ¡ ®I±VL]2 > 0
2
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